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Geopolitics and grand strategy are modern concepts of statecraft associated with the rise 
and decline of Great Powers. This chapter looks at the concept of geopolitics and its signif-
icance for grand strategy. It does so by tracing the development of the concepts and show-
ing how the meaning of the concepts evolved in response to changing world historical con-
texts. It explains why geopolitics and grand strategy are associated with the politics of 
Great Powers and why these concepts are currently making a comeback. The chapter then 
goes on to discuss the pitfalls and problems associated with formulating a grand strategy, 





The idea that world politics is ultimately driven by competition between a small number of Great Powers 
has recently been making a comeback. For more than a decade after the end of the cold war, it had been pos-
sible to believe that the rivalry between Great Powers was being replaced with the benign hegemony of the 
United States, the guarantor of a new liberal world order. As US President Clinton proclaimed in 1992, ‘In a 
world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of power politics does not compute. 
It is ill-suited to a new era’ (Clinton 1992). However, this picture no longer captures the dynamics of inter-
national politics. As Russia is at loggerheads with the West and China is becoming increasing assertive, ge-
opolitical rivalries are once again returning to the centre stage of world affairs. Nor is this just about military 
sabre-rattling in a few far-flung regions of the world. Partly as a result of increased economic interdepend-
ence since the end of the cold war, some non-Western states, first and foremost China, have gone through a 
sustained period of accelerated economic growth. In the meantime, the US and other major Western econo-
mies have suffered relative economic decline, a development accelerated by the effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis of 2008. 
In response, there have been calls for a new grand strategy to preserve the power of the United States in the 
face of this emerging challenge to its global dominance, with a renewed focus on geopolitics to counter the rise 
of China and other regional powers in the non-Western world. In the broadest sense, geopolitics is about the 
political implications of geographical space, the way that geography may contribute to conflict or convey stra-
tegic advantages. In association with grand strategy, it is a concept that is intimately connected to the idea of 
Great Powers as central actors in world affairs. 
Grand Strategy and geography 
Grand strategy is an evolution of strategy away from a narrow focus on victory in war towards a much 
broader, more long-term vision that is essentially political in nature (see Box 17.1). The strategist and his-
torian Paul Kennedy sees the essence of grand strategy in deliberating the proper balance of priorities of a 
state by coordinating ends and means (Kennedy 1991). Although security remains central, grand strategy is 
not limited to military strategy. Security in the context of grand strategy may be understood as securing and 
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enhancing the state’s interests, and securing it against external threats and possible opponents. Grand strat-
egy draws on all the military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic means and instruments at the state’s dis-
posal. In the most basic terms, it refers to a long-term, multi-dimensional plan for securing and enhancing a 
state’s power and prosperity. It is associated with states that have a wide range of global interests and a 
number of resources that can be mobilized, including the use of force. As the historian and strategist Wil-
liamson Murray put it, ‘grand strategy is a matter involving great states and great states alone’ (Murray 
2011: 1). However, it also implies a situation where resources are limited and where the leader of a power-
ful state has to make strategic, long-term choices about how to selectively invest resources and project its 
power. 
<start feature> 
BOX 17.1 Evolving Definitions of Grand Strategy and Geopolitics 
Grand Strategy 
Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of nations in 
order to sustain the fighting services. [. . .] it should not only combine the various instruments, but so 
regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for its security and prosperity. 
Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1935) 
Strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation [. . .] including its armed forces to 
the end that its vital interest shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or 
merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so 
integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or 
is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory. 
Edward Mead Earle (1943) 
The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring 
together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the 
nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests. 
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Paul Kennedy (1991) 
In a world where great states confront overstretch, they must make hard choices. Thus, in the end, grand 
strategy is more often than not about the ability to adjust to the reality that resources, will, and interests 
inevitably find themselves out of balance in some areas. 
Williamson Murray (2011) 
As far as a world power like America is concerned, a grand strategy involves first imagining some future 
world order within which the nation’s standing, prosperity and security are significantly enhanced, and 
then plotting and maintaining a course to that desired end while employing—to the fullest extent 
possible—all elements of our nation’s power toward generating those conditions. Naturally, such grand 
goals typically take decades to achieve. 
Thomas P. Barnett (2011) 
Strategy is oriented towards the future. It is a declaration of intent and an indication of the possible means 
required to fulfil that intent. But once strategy moves beyond the near term, it struggles to define exactly 
what it intends to do. [. . .] The operational plans of military strategy look to the near term and work with 
specific situations. Grand strategy, on the other hand, can entertain ambitions and goals that are more 
visionary and aspirational than pragmatic and immediate. 
Hew Strachan (2011) 
Geopolitics 
For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of 
the whole world, and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects [. . .] of geographical 
causation in universal history. 
Halford Mackinder (1904) 
Not by accident is the word ‘Politik’ preceded by that little prefix ‘geo.’ This prefix . . . relates politics to 
the soil. It rids politics of arid theories and senseless phrases which might trap our political leaders into 
hopeless utopias. It puts them back on solid ground. Geopolitik demonstrates the dependence of all 
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political developments on the permanent reality of the soil. 
Karl Haushofer (1942) 
Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states, because it is the most permanent. 
Nicholas Spykman (1942) 
1. All politics is geopolitics. 2. All strategy is geostrategy. 3. Geography is ‘out there’ objectively as 
environment or ‘terrain.’ 4. Geography also is ‘within us,’ in here, as imagined spatial relationships. 
Colin Gray (1999a) 
The geopolitical imagination [. . .] has never exercised absolute power over the course of world politics, in 
the sense of transcending the effects of technological, economic and other material determinants [. . .] the 
modern geopolitical imagination has, however, provided meaning and rationalization to practice by 
political élites the world over. It has defined the ‘ideological space,’ to use Immanuel Wallerstein’s phrase, 
from which the geographic categories upon which the world is organized and works are derived. 
John Agnew (2003) 
<end feature> 
In all of this, geography matters. Trade and communication routes are strategically important for large, 
economically powerful states, as is the location of natural resources. Any projection of power will have a 
geographical focus, since no state has the resources to be equally engaged everywhere at the same time. 
There is an important cultural component to this geographical factor—the outlooks of British and continen-
tal policymakers differ dramatically, partly because of Britain’s position as an island at the margin of the 
continent. Technological changes have significantly altered the significance of this geographic factor over 
the last century, but the image of Britain as an island remains powerful and is influential in Britain’s rela-
tions with Europe today (see Box 17.2). 
<start feature> 
BOX 17.2 The Persistence of Identity Narratives: Britain as an Island 
The idea of being an island has shaped British foreign policy for centuries. In the past, Britain’s island status 
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and its focus on sea power was central to the maintenance of the British Empire. It also meant that Britain 
was perceived to be separate from the rest of Europe. This might seem obvious: after all, Britain is 
physically separated from the continent by the English Channel. But while this separateness is reflected in 
identity narratives, British and continental European histories have always been intertwined through trade, 
invasions, and shared culture. 
Britain’s island identity has remained significant in British politics to this day, even though technological 
change, not least the channel tunnel, has vastly diminished physical distance. During debates about whether 
Britain should join the European Communities (now the European Union) in the 1960s, British politicians 
wondered whether Britain was really a part of Europe, and if joining would mean separation from the rest of 
the world. In the late 1980s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher frequently depicted Britain as an island 
separate from Europe, with more in common with other English-speaking places like the US, Canada, and 
Australia.  
The vote for Brexit in 2016 has brought Britain’s island identity to the fore once more as the referendum 
indicated a small majority in favour of separation from the EU. Although a divisive issue amongst the public 
and politicians, Prime Minister Theresa May has looked to approach the issue by announcing the return of 
‘Global Britain’, in which Britain is the hub of a global trading network. This posture recalls classic imperial 
themes of maritime Britain, partially distanced from Europe while at the centre of a worldwide network, 
managed by ‘lines of communication’ connecting it to places like India, Singapore, and Australia.  
<end feature> 
Imperial Competition and the Invention of Geopolitics 
Geopolitics and grand strategy are practical political concepts rather than academic theories. They do how-
ever share a focus on the politics of Great Powers and an emphasis on statecraft with classical Realism (see 
introductory chapter by Baylis and Wirtz). They also share the assumption that there are timeless patterns of 
state behaviour that can be uncovered and used as guidance for policymakers’ decisions—patterns that are at 
least in part determined by geography. In line with this anchoring in classical Realist thought, grand strategy 
is often depicted as a way of thinking that applies across all times and all places. This is not the case. Grand 
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strategy and geopolitics are distinctly modern and European concepts of statecraft, emerging as approaches 
to international politics only at a time when European and later US power acquired global reach. As the Brit-
ish geographer Halford Mackinder put it in 1904, by the turn of the twentieth century international politics 
for the first time had become a ‘closed political system [. . .] of world-wide scope’ (Mackinder 1904: 27). 
The development of geopolitics and grand strategy occurred in this context. 
Mackinder’s observation described a genuinely new development that reflected the imperial expansion of the 
European powers. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain, France, the Russian empire, and a num-
ber of latecomers to the imperial game were mapping and reclaiming most parts of the globe, often in competi-
tion with each other. By this point, the development of the European system of states had produced a small 
number of particularly powerful states, the Great Powers, which claimed special responsibility for managing 
international affairs. The colonial expansion of European Great Powers ushered in a new global competition, 
as unmapped and unclaimed parts of the globe became increasingly scarce. The ‘scramble for Africa’ between 
Britain, France, and other European powers and the colonial ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia between the British 
and the Russian empire heightened international tensions. 
Geography and the management of empire 
Imperial expansion highlighted the importance of geographical factors. Increasingly far-flung supply and 
trade routes by land and sea needed to be secured to enable economic growth at home. Overseas territories 
rich in natural resources were seen as strategic necessities for enhancing the prosperity and power of coloni-
al states. Colonial expansion fuelled capitalist development and enabled the British Empire to become a 
global hegemonic power. But by the last decades of the nineteenth century, both the newly unified German 
state and the United States were rapidly industrializing and began to challenge Britain’s economic domi-
nance. Germany in particular was becoming a disruptive force in international political dynamics still domi-
nated by the European powers. As a latecomer to the circle of European Great Powers, the German Reich 
had missed out on much of the colonial expansion, but its leaders set out to change that by aggressive global 
politics. This included investing heavily in naval rearmament—potentially challenging British naval power 
at the same time as Britain acquired ever more far-flung possessions in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. 
The increasingly tense international situation at the turn of the twentieth century was reflected in attempts by 
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various European and American thinkers to systematically explain international affairs by reference to geogra-
phy. The American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that sea power was of crucial strategic im-
portance and advocated that the US join the imperial scramble. Partly due to his influence, the US entered the 
naval arms race and became engaged in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In contrast, Mackinder, a ge-
ographer and politician, was worried about Britain’s long-term decline. He believed that new technologies 
such as the railways were increasing the strategic significance of land over sea, increasing the power of Germany 
and the Russian empire and threatening the global dominance of Britain, which largely relied on sea power. He 
declared one area in particular to be central to global dominance: the Eurasian Heartland, comprising large parts 
of Russia and Central Asia (see Figure 17.1). 
Figure 17.1 Mackinder’s View of the Heartland 
Source: H.J. Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal, vol. 24, no. 4, 
1904, p. 435. 
Mackinder condensed his theory into a famous, and still influential, quote: ‘Who rules East Europe com-
mands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World Island 
commands the World’ (Mackinder 1919). The size of countries and the importance of population growth 
was the main concern of German geographers, most notoriously Friedrich Ratzel, who developed the con-
cept of Lebensraum (‘living space’) which later became central in Hitler’s geopolitical thinking. Ratzel pos-
ited a historical difference between the settled Aryan races populating German territory and the marauding 
tribes to the east that threatened them. He proposed that modern Germany should secure additional land and 
resources to counter an ever-present threat from Russia. Rudolph Kiellen, the Swedish geographer who first 
coined the term Geopolitik (geopolitics) combined elements of these theories in his claim that states have to 
face two strategic imperatives to survive and thrive: demography, or the management of people (ethnopoli-
tik), and the management of territorial expansion (geopolitik). 
Geopolitical competition for survival 
These classical geopolitical theories reflected prevalent ideas of their time. They grew out of a belief that 
everything, including international politics, could be understood scientifically by uncovering the causal fac-
tors that drive the behaviour of human beings and states. Geography was seen as such an objective factor in 
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world politics. By virtue of natural resources, climate, location, and size, strategic advantages were be-
stowed on some states, while others were trapped in unfavourable conditions. However, this was also a time 
of rapid technological change fuelled by scientific discovery, and this was reflected in the concern of Mac-
kinder and others with technology and its interaction with geography. Importantly, these thinkers saw com-
petition as the essence of world politics, pitting states against each other in a race for global dominance. 
What was at stake was survival—the idea that only the strongest, most resourceful states would continue to 
exist. This vision was influenced by a popular pseudo-scientific theory of the time, Social Darwinism. It re-
volved around the idea that there is a process of natural selection, a fight for the survival of the fittest and 
strongest, not just among species but also between peoples and states. Germany and the United States in par-
ticular were cast as vigorous and rapidly growing, while established powers such as Britain and France were 
exhausted and in decline. 
<start feature> 
Key Points 
● The emergence of geopolitics reflected a new sense that the world was now a unified political space at 
the end of the nineteenth century, which emerged as a result of the imperial competition of European 
Great Powers. 
● It also reflected a shifting constellation of power, with British economic strength in decline and Germany 
and the United States rising as new powerful actors in world politics. 
● Classical geopolitical thought links territory to power and sees world politics as a competition between 
the most powerful states. It proposes that geographical and other environmental factors explain why some 
states thrive while others decline. 
<end feature> 
World War II, the Cold War, and the Development of Grand Strategy 
From the start, geopolitical thought was about strategy—geographic factors were thought to determine the 
behaviour of states over long periods of time and could therefore be drawn on for the formulation of a strat-
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egy over decades. In the interwar years, this expansion of the strategic horizon was reflected in the new con-
cept of grand strategy (see Box 17.1). Basil Liddell Hart, the British military historian who first coined the 
phrase, referred to grand strategy as the ‘higher level’ of wartime strategy, coordinating all the resources at a 
state’s disposal towards the political ends of a war. After the outbreak of World War II, the term was adopt-
ed by American strategists, in particular Edward Mead Earle, whose thoughts on grand strategy remained 
influential for decades to come. Another wartime advocate of a US grand strategy, Nicholas Spykman, 
adopted Mackinder’s theory of the heartland to respond to the looming conflict with the Soviet Union at the 
end of the war. Arguing that control over the ‘rimland’, Central Europe, would decide the fate of world poli-
tics, he urged US policymakers to remain engaged in Europe to counter possible Soviet dominance of the 
continent. 
Both Mead Earle and Spykman responded to the growing threat of a large-scale confrontation with the 
Soviet Union, which became a reality as World War II drew to an end. Spykman’s admonition did become 
US policy, and as the cold war unfolded, a grand strategy inspired by a geopolitical view of the world re-
mained one of its guiding principles. From the start, the cold war was a global struggle with specific regional 
geopolitical dynamics. Stalin installed communist leaders in the newly liberated states of Eastern Europe 
and integrated these states into a Soviet-led alliance system that was motivated by geopolitics as much as 
ideology. This was mirrored in the development of the US strategic doctrine of containment, which similarly 
applied a geopolitical rationale to the ideological focus of the cold war, and remained in place until the de-
mise of the Soviet Union (see Box 17.3). 
The revival of geopolitical thinking after World War II 
Given the global scope of the cold war and its long-term strategic horizon, it may seem surprising that the 
actual concepts of geopolitics and grand strategy were by no means central tenets of strategic thinking dur-
ing the cold war and fell out of use for decades, to be revived only in the 1970s and 1980s. In part, this re-
flected the way that geopolitical ideas had become thoroughly de-legitimized by their association with Nazi 
Germany. Another factor was the start of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, which seemed to obliterate the geographical factor in world politics. As both sides developed inter-
continental ballistic missile systems capable of destroying each other’s cities in a matter of hours, a grand 
 11 
strategy based on geopolitical considerations—such as the difference between land power and sea power—
seemed obsolete. In fact, deterrence, the foundation of US military strategy during the cold war, had no con-
nection to geopolitical reasoning; it was purely based on out-arming and out-spending the Soviet Union, ex-
panding nuclear and conventional capabilities to deter the Soviet Union from using its own nuclear weapons. 
<start feature> 
BOX 17.3 Containment 
Containment was first developed at the onset of the cold war by George F. Kennan, a diplomat who had 
studied the Soviet Union closely. He proposed a strategy which relied on countering Soviet influence ‘by the 
adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
points’ (Kennan 1947). By the 1950s, the competition for spheres of influence between the United States 
and the Soviet Union acquired a global dimension, partly as a result of decolonization in Africa and Asia. 
Containment was reformulated and expanded into what became known as ‘domino theory’—the idea that 
Soviet influence had to be countered everywhere, since one state turning communist could easily spread 
communism to neighbouring states until an entire world region would fall. Containment was a form of 
geopolitics, but one which encompassed ideological competition as well as competition for resources. It 
required the US to engage across all areas of the globe to stop the spread of communism, whether or not the 
countries concerned were strategically important. In Vietnam in particular, hundreds of thousands of US 
soldiers were sent to help fight communist guerrillas in a costly, drawn-out, and ultimately unsuccessful war. 
Overall, containment was a consistent, if not always consistently implemented, grand strategic framework 
that was remarkably long-lived. Since the Soviet Union remained the much weaker economy, containment 
was an effective long-term strategy that helped to drain Soviet resources, though it was by no means the 
only factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
<end feature> 
By the 1970s, as the economic burden of the nuclear arms race began to be felt in the US, and it seemed for a 
while that the Soviet Union would become the dominant military power, geopolitics began to be re-evaluated 
in US policy circles. This revival was associated in particular with two influential figures, Henry Kissinger and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Kissinger, as national security advisor to President Nixon, was the architect of warmer 
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relations with communist China, a policy that was later expanded by Brzezinski. Kissinger’s understanding of 
geopolitics as Great Power politics was influenced by a deep knowledge of European history and the varying 
ways in which the balance of power between the European Great Powers had played out over centuries. He 
believed in the continuing relevance of power balancing as a principle of international politics. Brzezinski’s 
understanding of geopolitics drew more explicitly on Mackinder’s heartland theory. Like Mackinder, he saw 
control over the Eurasian landmass as central to world domination and eventual victory in the cold war. Both 
Kissinger and Brzezinski advocated a move away from the bipolar stalemate between the United States and the 
Soviet Union towards a more dynamic multipolar order by engaging with communist China, which a decade 
earlier had fallen out with the Soviet Union over questions of communist doctrine. A US–Chinese rapproche-
ment was aimed at weakening the grip of the Soviet Union over the Eurasian landmass, and above all at pre-
venting a mending of relations between the two communist countries which would have led to absolute Soviet 
dominance of the Eurasian continent. 
<start feature> 
Key Points 
● The concept of Grand Strategy was first developed in the context of World War II and was an extension 
of the long-term strategic view inherent in geopolitical thought. 
● Both the Soviet Union and the United States acted geopolitically during the cold war. Containment was a 
grand strategy informed by geopolitical reasoning, but driven by ideological concerns rather than 
resource competition. 
● The revival of geopolitics in the 1970s occurred at a time when the US was seen to be in relative decline, 
and means other than the nuclear arms race were sought to secure its position. 
<end feature> 
Geopolitics and Grand Strategy Today 
Geopolitics and grand strategy as concepts of statecraft first emerged at a specific historical constellation: 
the long-term decline of a hegemonic power and the rise of new challengers. There are parallels between the 
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situation of the British empire at the turn of the twentieth century and the global position of the United 
States today. The period of global primacy that the US enjoyed after the cold war may not be over, but glob-
al shifts are unfolding that make it appear less durable and absolute than a decade ago. As in the case of im-
perial Britain, this is driven by relative economic decline. The inexorable economic rise of China, now the 
world’s second largest economy, was accelerated by the global economic crisis of 2008, which many emerg-
ing economies weathered better than Europe and the United States. Nor is this just an issue of Chinese eco-
nomic growth. Over the last two decades, the combined GDP of the Group of Seven industrialized nations as 
a percentage of the world’s total has decreased from over 70 per cent to 50 per cent (Laub and McBride 
2017). This redistribution of global wealth away from the US and Western Europe towards the major devel-
oping economies in the global South is unprecedented in the modern era. 
Consequences of this shift are beginning to affect international politics. As the US academic Jon Alterman 
put it, China’s demands are now ‘too large not to affect the global environment, and its external vulnerabili-
ties are too large to rely on others to defend them’ (Alterman 2013: 2). Familiar geopolitical themes, such as 
the need to secure resources, are driving China’s new global engagement. China is poor in energy resources 
and aims to secure supplies for its expanding economy. It is now the world’s second largest consumer of oil 
and its demand for gas is rapidly increasing (US Energy Information Administration International Energy 
Outlook 2017). The presence of China in regions such as the Middle East and its growing energy relation-
ship with Russia has broader geopolitical implications. It gives new leverage to regional players the US has 
been trying to isolate, such as Syria and Iran, and provides the backdrop for Russia’s continued assertiveness 
over Ukraine. China’s current reliance on energy supplied via sea routes controlled by the United States has 
been driving regional tensions over Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea (see Box 17.4). 
Challenges to US dominance 
Unlike Germany in the 1890s, neither China nor Russia is directly challenging the US in military terms, 
and would not be in a position to do so. US defence spending is in decline, but the United States remains the 
world’s largest military power by far, accounting for more than a third of total global military expenditure in 
2016 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2017). Yet, both China and Russia 
are rearming. Russia is currently embarking on an ambitious programme of military modernization, while 
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China is increasing its defence spending by double digits each year. And as Russia’s stand-off with the West 
over Syria and Ukraine and China’s stance in the South China Sea demonstrate, both are increasingly will-
ing to challenge regional security orders sustained by the United States. In addition, as the territorial order 
imposed by Western colonial powers is breaking down in the Middle East, Iran is seizing its chance to ex-
tend its regional influence and challenge the dominance of US allies such as Saudi Arabia. In all these re-
gions, new security issues are becoming intertwined with more traditional geopolitical challenges to US 
primacy. 
<start feature> 
BOX 17.4 The US ‘Pivot to Asia’ 
The US ‘Pivot to Asia’, a major strategic shift to a renewed engagement in East Asia, was partly motivated 
by a wish to curb increasing Chinese assertiveness in the region. China has been staking out territorial 
claims over islands in the South China Sea, to secure maritime shipping routes as well as potential energy 
resources in the maritime shelf belonging to these islands. It has increased its naval presence and started to 
invest heavily in building up a blue water navy. This has led to tensions with some of its neighbours, in 
particular Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan—the latter being two key US military allies in the region. The 
military dimension of the pivot may be contributing to a ‘spiral of insecurity’ in which the other side reacts 
to a perceived threat by building up its own military capacities. Partly in response to the pivot, China has 
accelerated and expanded its naval armament. Japan, China’s traditional adversary in the region, has been 
encouraged by the renewed US engagement to escalate its own simmering tensions with China and is 
pushing for re-militarization. While the pivot may have reassured America’s partners and thwarted Chinese 




BOX 17.5 Russia, Ukraine, and the West 
The continuing stand-off between Russia and the West over influence in Ukraine seems to confirm 
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Brzezinski’s dictum that Ukraine is a ‘pivot state’ because of its sensitive geopolitical location (Brzezinski 
1997). While Ukraine’s strategic location is important to Russia, Russia’s meddling in Eastern Ukraine is not 
explained by a focus on resources and geostrategy alone. Ukraine has a central place in Russian identity 
narratives; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russians found it hard to accept Ukrainian 
independence. Putin’s project of a Eurasian economic union was partly designed to bind Ukraine to Russia and 
stop its move towards closer association with the EU. The immediate context that triggered the Ukrainian 
crisis in 2013 was then president Victor Yanukovich’s intention to sign an association (trade) agreement with 
the EU. This was not a geopolitical zero-sum game—the trade agreement and the Eurasian economic union 
were not mutually exclusive. But relations between Russia and the EU had deteriorated, partly as a result of 
EU support for the democratic ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and the ‘conservative turn’ and 
erosion of Russian democracy under Putin. There is now a clear rejection by the Kremlin of a liberal European 
identity for Russia—and Russia is attempting to export this illiberalism by supporting far-right movements 
across Europe. In terms of broader geopolitics of identity, the EU stands for the West, Russia’s external 
‘Other’ against which Russian identity is defined. The association agreement was perceived in Moscow in 
terms of these geopolitics of identity, as a move to join a liberal Western ‘Other’. Ukraine is pivotal because of 
the meaning attached to it by Russian policymakers, which in turn links to broader perceptions of the 
relationship between Russia and the West. 
<end feature> 
In this complex strategic environment, a number of commentators have argued that the United States suf-
fers from ‘imperial overstretch’, a term coined by Paul Kennedy for a situation where excessive defence 
budgets undermine the prosperity of a country and weaken it internationally as a result (Kennedy 1988). 
While the proportion of US defence spending in relation to GDP is still less than that of many smaller 
states, stagnant economic growth since the global economic crisis means that bloated defence budgets are 
becoming a problem. At the same time, the diverging nature of the actual and potential threats presented by 
transnational terrorism and other non-state actors and the revival of geopolitical competition mean that 
there are increasingly hard choices to be made about how to invest limited resources. 
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Evolving understandings of Great Power competition 
The emphasis on peacetime development reflects shifting understandings of Great Power competition 
and Great Power war since 1945. Before World War I, wars between Great Powers were frequent and lim-
ited in scale, and often used to effect power transitions. However, World War I and World War II showed 
that military technology had developed to a point where war between major industrialized states involved 
exorbitant social and economic costs. This was exacerbated by the arrival of atomic weapons at the onset 
of the cold war. A highly interdependent global economy has further diminished the returns and increased 
the costs of Great Power war. Partly as a result of these developments, there has been no direct war be-
tween major powers since 1945. It is therefore not surprising that the current discourse on rising powers 
has foregrounded relative economic development over simple rankings of military capabilities. The broad-
er aim of securing the prosperity and power of the polity may or may not mean a major role for defence 
and the armed forces—it depends on the nature of the strategic environment, which determines how these 
aims can be achieved. 
<start feature> 
Key Points 
● The rise of China and the relative economic decline of the US are driving the current revival of interest in 
geopolitics and grand strategy. 
● China’s economic expansion and its need for energy supplies are already having an effect on political 
dynamics in various regions of the world. 
● The US remains militarily dominant. Russia, China and some other states are rearming, but at present this 
is not a direct challenge. 
● It has been argued that the US suffers from ‘imperial overstretch’, spending so much on its defence 
budget that it is weakened overall. 
● The emphasis of grand strategy has shifted to peacetime development, partly because war between Great 
Powers now seems improbable. 
<end feature> 
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Grand Strategy in a Complex World 
It is not difficult to find declarations of long-term strategic ambitions in the public statements of policy-
makers, especially those representing major powers. However, a proliferation of strategic documents and 
the declaration of lofty aims are not necessarily an indication that a grand strategy exists and is being im-
plemented. The historical record is patchy. As Williamson Murray remarked, ‘those who have developed 
successful grand strategies in the past have been very much the exception . . . a strategic framework, much 
less a grand strategy has rarely guided those responsible for the long-term survival of the state’ (Murray 
2011: 3). There are many obstacles to the successful formulation of a grand strategy, let alone its imple-
mentation, in an uncertain and complex international environment. A grand strategy is by its very nature 
comprehensive, encompassing in the words of one author ‘a clear understanding of the nature o f the inter-
national environment, a country’s highest goals and interests within that environment, the primary threats 
to those goals and interests, and the way that finite resources can be used to deal with competing challeng-
es and opportunities’ (Brands 2014: 13). A grand strategist must understand and assess an exceptionally 
broad range of factors, individually and in relation to each other. As Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, 
this is a problematic assumption (Freedman 2013). There are limitations related to the imperfect function-
ing of the machinery of the state within which the grand strategist must operate. The information reaching 
the decision maker from the lower levels of bureaucracy may be incomplete or biased, and the gap be-
tween formulation and implementation of policies is exponentially increased in a strategy aimed at guid-
ing policy over a long period of time in diverse and evolving circumstances. Even assuming a perfectly 
operational decision-making environment, the level of complexity involved in formulating a grand strate-
gy poses questions about its feasibility. The holistic assessment of such a broad range of factors may 
simply surpass the limits of human intelligence. It certainly raises questions about contingency and pre-
dictability in a system as complex as the international environment. 
Contextualising grand strategy 
A grand strategy is a guiding framework that allows policymakers to steer through the uncertainties of a 
complex international environment. Finding such a framework becomes more difficult the more uncertain 
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this environment is and the more it presents different and sometimes mutually incompatible strategic chal-
lenges. It is not a coincidence that conceptions of grand strategy first emerged at a time when the range of 
actors posing a potential threat to Britain and the United States was limited and the threat was clear. The 
idea of a grand strategy bears the imprint of its time, in particular in implicit assumptions about just how 
clear and consensual the interests and goals of a state really are. The current revival of thinking about grand 
strategy faces a very different scenario from that of the cold war—in fact, calls for a new grand strategy for 
the United States have arisen precisely because of this new complexity (see Critical Thinking). Moreover, 
the ends of a grand strategy, in the most general sense of defining the national interest, have also become 
more difficult to formulate in the absence of a single overarching threat. While there is a connection between 
primacy and prosperity, the precise balance is ultimately a political decision and open to political contesta-
tion, especially where competing demands are made on finite resources. 
Even where ends are reasonably clear, the long-term nature of grand strategy and the complexity of the 
global environment make it difficult to employ adequate means and formulate concrete policies. In a com-
plex system, there will be contingencies and unpredictable events with multiple interdependent causes, 
sometimes the future unintended consequences of strategic decisions taken today. These contingencies 
may escalate into ‘black swan’ events: improbable, large-scale events that have transformative effects and 
are largely unpredictable to a given set of observers (Taleeb and Blythe 2011). In fact, contingent events 
are commonplace in international history and are often the cause of major upheavals. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and 9/11 both fall into this category; informed observers failed to predict them, and their 
consequences changed the dynamics of international politics. By definition, there can be no planning for 
the surprising and unexpected, though grand strategies should provide guiding principles for making sense 
of and responding to these kinds of large-scale events. However, there is a real danger that the interpreta-
tive ‘lenses’ provided by a grand strategy may blind the decision-maker to the transformative consequenc-
es of a contingent event and thus prevent rather than enable an adequate reaction. The line between a clear 
guiding principle and rigidity is thin, and can have far-reaching consequences when crossed. A grand 
strategy that fails to grasp how a contingent event changes the dynamics of international interaction, or 
that has identified trends in world politics wrongly from the outset, may trigger the very kind of develop-
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ment it set out to avoid. Strategic decisions are applied in context, in a highly dynamic international envi-
ronment populated by other actors that inevitably react to policy moves directed at them (see Box 17.4). 
Strategic horizons in the modern world 
Policymakers are well aware of the uncertainties of their decision-making environment. Since the end of 
the cold war, strategic documents make habitual reference to the complexity of the international environ-
ment and stress the need for adaptability and flexibility in strategic planning. Given its extended time hori-
zon, grand strategy must be able to adapt to changing contexts in a complex and always evolving interna-
tional system. However, if flexibility and adaptability are key, is the formulation of long-term holistic 
frameworks a useful endeavour? Critics of the idea of grand strategy have pointed out that it is too general 
and the international environment too complex for it to be of much use in concrete situations facing the deci-
sion-maker (Strachan 2011; Krasner 2010; Dombrowski and Reich 2017). And yet, while the difficulties in-
herent in grand strategic thinking are immense, in a modern state the lack of an overall strategic direction 
can be even more detrimental. This remains true above all for Great Powers, which will by definition have a 
wide variety of divergent and sometimes contradictory interests in far-flung locations, but rarely enough re-
sources to cover all of them. 
In the absence of a grand strategic framework, strategic decisions will still be made, but the risk that they 
will be based on short-term pressures or on unexamined bias increases. Frequently, the result may be non-
decisions, ‘muddling through’ as a result of bureaucratic inertia, or policies formulated on the basis of past 
approaches wholly inadequate for a changing strategic context (Lindblom 1959). This kind of non-decision 
can have far-reaching consequences. The failure to formulate a new European security architecture that 
could bind in a newly democratic Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union is a case in point. Instead, 
NATO, the cold war institution that had been created explicitly to defend Western Europe against the Sovi-
et Union, reformulated its mission statement and was enlarged eastwards. The unintended consequence of 
NATO enlargement and further NATO actions in Europe, especially the bombardment of Serbia over Koso-
vo in 1999, was a strengthening of nationalist and anti-Western forces in Russia and an increasingly fraught 
relationship with the West. William Clinton, the US president endorsing these decisions, did not believe in 
the idea of grand strategy (Brands 2014). The initial decision to enlarge seems to have been driven mainly 
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by persistent lobbying by the smaller East European states and a vague sense that this would help consoli-
date a liberal community of values in Europe (Schimmelpfennig 2000). Somewhat ironically given what has 
been said about the pitfalls of grand strategy, its long-term horizon and holistic approach may be necessary 
to recognize the dangerous implications of short-term decisions responding to past contexts. 
<start feature> 
Key Points 
● In a complex and fluid world, it has become much more difficult to formulate grand strategies. 
● Rigid grand strategies, or those based on the wrong assumptions, can have negative consequences, since 
they blind decision-makers to unpredictable changes in the strategic environment. 
● For a large powerful state, grand strategic planning may be necessary, since the effects of simply 
‘muddling through’ may be worse. 
<end feature> 
Rethinking Geopolitics 
The grand strategist must be flexible and adaptable, but also look out for persistent structures that allow 
him or her to specify strategic aims. The original association between geopolitics and grand strategy de-
rives exactly from this conundrum. Constants such as a state’s size, location, climate, and resources were 
seen as objective constraining and enabling factors that allowed predictions of a state’s power and influ-
ence. Even though the scientific credentials of this kind of geographical determinism have long since been 
called into question, geography remains inextricably intertwined with the making of grand strategy. For 
one, grand strategy has to be geographically specific in the sense of being located in and directed at a spe-
cific context. Factors of physical geography, like the size of states, their location and their neighbours, 
remain fundamentally important in this regard. The isolated geographical position of the United States, 
without major competitors or threats in close proximity, provides security but also makes it logistically 
difficult to project power. On the other hand, Russia’s open and porous borders, its proximity to major 
competitors, and its harsh climate are all potential vulnerabilities. A state’s access to resources also re-
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mains central, and hydrocarbon resources in particular are as important now as they were when classical 
geopolitical thinkers first constructed their theories. Nevertheless, resource bases, just as other aspects of 
physical geography, are not a fixed and unchanging factor of world politics. Currently, a major strategic 
shift is under way as a result of new technologies for the exploitation of non-conventional energy re-
sources. It makes the United States less dependent on oil from the Middle East; in fact, the US is becom-
ing a net energy exporter (IEA World Energy Outlook 2017). As this example illustrates, seemingly per-
manent geographic factors such as the location of resources can be altered by the development of new 
technologies. The interaction between geography and technological change is a central feature of geopol i-
tics. 
Nevertheless, simply focussing on the relationship between geography and technology fails to capture a 
central way in which geography becomes relevant to world politics. The geographical context within 
which policymaking necessarily orients itself not only refers to factors of physical geography. As the 
strategist Colin Gray put it, ‘Although there is a brute force existentiality to physical geography, as a gen-
eralization it is geography in the mind, of the imagination, that matters most. [. . .] The geography is as 
unarguable as its perceived political meaning is contestable’ (Gray 2013: 118). Brute geographical facts 
acquire their significance in cultural and social contexts. This starts with the fact that cultures and civiliza-
tions are located in particular geographical spaces. On a different scale, human beings attach meaning to 
places, meaning that can become politically and strategically significant. Often, especially where particu-
lar sites and territories are part of narratives of collective identity, these interpretations can become power-
ful mobilizing factors. This has been true for the many ethnic conflicts of the post-cold war world. But 
identity and territory are also linked in the nation-state, and interpretations of geography can be and often 
are a powerful influence on foreign policymaking. Often, these identity narratives are about dynamics of 
‘Othering’, the inclusion in or exclusion from an imagined geopolitical space. The relationship between 
Russia and the ‘West’ (in itself such an imagined space, comprising countries and institutions supporting a 
US-dominated liberal order) is a case in point (see Box 17.5). 
Geopolitics and identity 
The role played by interpretation and identity complicates the uses of geography for the making of grand 
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strategy. Yet, the effects of geography are inescapable in international politics, whether they are the ‘brute 
force’ of geographical constraints in a given strategic context, or the role played by interpretations of geog-
raphy. There clearly is value in reflecting on the way that decision-makers’ interpretations of geography may 
affect their formulation of strategy, as well as in understanding the meaning particular geographic factors 
have for an adversary. As the persistent identity of Britain as an island nation illustrates, specific interpreta-
tions of geography in a narrative of collective identity are remarkably long-lived (see Box 17.2). However, 
this comes with a caveat—it is all too easy to assume that interpretations of geography in identity narratives 
are fixed, leading to the kind of rigidity that undermines the aims of a grand strategy. Instead, collective 
meanings and identities are fluid and often politically contested, and are always re-interpreted in particular 
contexts. Classical geopolitics conceptualized the geographic factor as timeless and universal. However, the 
basic meaning of geopolitics, the political uses of geography, draws attention to context, which is always 
situated and specific. Interpretations of geographical factors, just as objective geographic constraints, may be 
long-lived, but it is the task of the grand strategist to assess how they play out in any given situation. 
<start feature> 
Key Points 
● Geography is not a fixed and immutable factor in world affairs. 
● Technological change affects the way that geographical factors play out in international politics. 
● Geographical factors matter both as external constraints and because they are interpreted and politically 
contested, and often part of identity narratives. 
● This duality complicates the uses of geopolitics for grand strategy, but also adds a new, important 
dimension that makers of grand strategy need to take into account. 
<end feature> 
<start feature> 
Critical Thinking Debating . . . America First 
The US has not substantially reduced its military spending from cold war levels and continues to pursue 
active, global foreign policies. Trump won the presidential elections in 2016 partly on the promise to end 
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this practice and ‘put America first’. With financial pressures and recent, unpopular wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, should the US pull back from the world? 
For 
● Favourable geopolitics. With two weak and friendly neighbours—Canada and Mexico—and surrounded 
by open seas, there is no genuine threat to US territory. Its huge nuclear arsenal also acts as a powerful 
deterrent. 
● Creating more enemies. By aggressively pursuing the ‘war on terror’, the US is already creating more 
enemies amongst Muslims. An active foreign policy could encourage rivals such as China and Russia 
into an alliance which could dominate Eurasia—they are already getting closer, partly in response to US 
actions and are both rearming. 
● Free-riding allies. America’s allies can ‘free-ride’ on US power. NATO members are able to reduce 
military spending, knowing that they are protected by the US nuclear umbrella; Israel and Taiwan can 
embark upon risky policies guaranteed by Washington. 
Against 
● No danger from rival coalitions. US military preponderance means it need not worry about coalitions of 
other powers forming against it. Moreover, China and Russia have a long history of mutual suspicion and 
the Kremlin might fear dependence on China’s economic might. 
● Defence technology leverage. By maintaining a large defence budget, the US has leverage over other 
countries which need American technology. Britain, for example, can only purchase certain components 
of its nuclear deterrent from the US. 
● Strong, prosperous relationships. Alliances such as NATO lessen the likelihood of being dragged into 
unnecessary wars by creating a network of strong relationships and trust. These alliances and active 
American engagement in the world guarantee global trade and prosperity. An ‘America First’ approach 




1. Should the US pull back and ‘put America first’? 
2. Should the US pull back in Asia but increase its presence elsewhere? 
3. To what extent is the US in decline as a global superpower? 
<end feature> 
Conclusion 
Formulating and implementing a grand strategy in today’s complex international environment is an 
exceedingly difficult task, and not helped by the fact that geography is not the kind of scientific long-
term grounding for grand strategy that the classical geopoliticians imagined. However, this complexity 
may be the very reason a grand strategy should be attempted. In an evolving international environment, 
it is dangerous to continue implementing policies and approaches that no longer fit the times. It is 
equally dangerous to attempt a grand strategy directed at the wrong target, and with an erroneous 
understanding of what is needed to achieve desired ends—US President George W. Bush’s strategy in 
the war on terror may serve as an example. Nevertheless, the multiple challenges that affect the world 
today are so diverse that a concerted attempt to balance ends and means seems more necessary than 
ever. In democratic states this means that the welfare and prosperity of the nation, in line with the 
values of the polity, are the ultimate end. Grand strategy is about the right balance between means and 
ends, not about hedging against all possible threats and winning wars at all costs. In all of this, thinking 
geopolitically is central, in the most basic sense that geography is central to politics and foreign policy 
must be geographically focused. However, geographic factors are not an objective and unchanging 
determinant of world politics. Their political implications may lay precisely in the meanings they carry 
for particular actors. Perceptions of geographical factors, especially where they involve identity 
narratives, can be long-lasting, but they are not fixed and the way they become politicized in any 
particular situation is highly context-dependent. Even though this complicates the relationship between 
geopolitics and grand strategy, it remains a fundamental factor that the grand strategist has to grapple 
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with in a challenging and fluid international environment. 
Questions 
1. What are the aims of grand strategy? 
2. Why is there renewed interest in geopolitics and grand strategy at this particular historical juncture? 
3. What explains the emergence of geopolitical thought at the turn of the twentieth century? 
4. Compare and contrast evolving definitions of grand strategy and geopolitics. How and why have 
these definitions changed? 
5. To what extent was the grand strategy of containment during the cold war motivated by geopolitical 
reasoning? 
6. What are the problems inherent in formulating grand strategies? Can they be overcome? 
7. Why is grand strategy associated with the statecraft of Great Powers? 
8. How has geopolitics traditionally been associated with grand strategy? What are the problems of 
this association? 
9. If geopolitics is both about the ‘out there’ and the ‘in here’, as Colin Gray has written (Box 17.1), 
what is its use for the formulation of grand strategy? 
10. Is the rise of China a challenge to US primacy? 
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